There is recent interest in using discrete choice experiments (DCEs) to derive health state utility values, and results can differ from time tradeoff (TTO). Clearly, DCE is ''choice based,'' whereas TTO is generally considered a ''matching'' task. We explore whether procedural adaptations to the TTO, which make the method more closely resemble a DCE, make TTO and choice converge. In particular, we test whether making the matching procedure in TTO less ''transparent'' to the respondent reduces disparities between TTO and DCE. We designed an interactive survey that was hosted on the Internet, and 2022 interviews were achieved in the United Kingdom in a representative sample of the population. We found a marked divergence between TTO and DCE, but this was not related to the ''transparency'' of the TTO procedure. We conclude that a difference in the error structure between TTO and choice and that factors other than differences in utility are affecting choices is driving the divergence. The latter has fundamental implications for the way choice data are analyzed and interpreted.
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(Med Decis Making 2017;37:273-284) T here has been recent interest in the use of discrete choice experiments (DCE) to derive health state utilities for use in quality-adjusted life year (QALY) calculations. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] When compared head to head, DCE and time tradeoff (TTO) have been shown to arrive at different utility estimates, 3, 6 but to date, little research has gone into exploring the factors that might be driving differences. Arguments have been put forward previously regarding the relative merits of DCE compared with ''traditional'' methods such as TTO and standard gamble (SG). For example, it has been argued that traditional value elicitation techniques, such as TTO and SG, that set out to establish an individual's point of indifference are more cognitively demanding than those involving pairwise choices. 4, 5 For example, in discussing the TTO, Bansback and colleagues consider ''there is still a concern that the tasks involved are still too cognitively demanding for certain populations, resulting in response inconsistencies and subsequent data exclusions, which limit the representativeness of the values obtained.'' 1(p306) There are, of course, a number of features of an actual DCE that may explain differences in valuations across methods, such as the functional form of the model deployed in modeling the choice data. We are interested here, however, in the choices themselves and not how the choice data are subsequently modeled. There are many reasons why a DCE that sets out to value health state utilities using time as the numeraire-sometimes referred to as DCE TTO -may yield systematically different valuations from traditional TTO.
It has been observed for some time that preferences over 2 options can change depending on the elicitation procedure used. In particular, it is well known that ''matching'' and ''choice'' tasks yield different results, 7 and this has been studied previously in relation to health state utility measurement. [8] [9] [10] In 1 study using TTO, Attema and Brouwer 10 found significantly different valuations between matching and choice along with the presence of preference reversals. Matching may encourage more quantitative decision-making processes and give more weight to the attribute used as the ''currency'' on which to match, while choice may encourage more qualitative decision making and give more weight to the most ''prominent'' attribute. 7, 11 While, on the face of it, this may appear to offer an explanation of any differences between DCE and more traditional utility elicitation methods, in reality, TTO (and SG) are generally operationalized as a series of pairwise choices that set out to ''home in'' on a point of indifference, a technique that has been referred to as ''choice-based matching.'' 12 Fischer and colleagues 12 developed the taskgoal hypothesis and argued that more weight is given to the prominent attribute when the aim is to differentiate between options (as in choice) than in tasks where the aim is to equate options (as in matching). They showed that when the objective-or goal-of the matching task was made less transparent using a ''hidden choice-based matching'' technique, preference reversals between matching and choice were reduced.
Applying this to the context here, it will generally be obvious to respondents that a TTO is iterating toward a point of indifference and they are being asked via this process to ''match'' a number of years in normal health to X years in the target health state. This aim could, however, be made less transparent to respondents, and the findings of Fischer and others 12 lead us to hypothesize this will reduce differences between TTO and direct choice. This essentially involves using an iterative procedure to arrive at the point of indifference in TTO but moves away from valuing states sequentially where one state is valued before moving on to the next. In contrast, states could be valued concurrently, whereby the respondent sees different states in alternating questions (this will be explained in detail below). Arguably, the task in TTO would be even less transparent if noniterative procedures were used to arrive at the point(s) of indifference. Valuing health states concurrently in TTO using a noniterative procedure is more in line with how states would be valued within a DCE.
The issue of interest here is whether we can predict choices between health profiles based on respondents' TTO valuations. Such a prediction clearly requires the imposition of restrictions on the utility function for health. We could assume, for example, that the linear QALY model holds and simply estimate the total number of QALYs in each alternative and predict that the respondent will choose the alternative offering the higher number. Linearity is, however, a very restrictive assumption, so we rely here on the weaker conditions of mutual utility independence (MUI) and constant proportional tradeoff (CPTO), which allow subjects to discount future health. More details about these assumptions are given in Appendix 1 (available online). We then test whether choices can be predicted from TTO responses when the TTO procedure varies according to how ''transparent'' the TTO task is in relation to a) whether an iterative or noniterative procedure is used to arrive at a point of indifference and b) whether health states are valued ''sequentially'' or ''concurrently.'' If varying these factors can offer an explanation of differences between TTO and direct choice, then we would expect doing so to a) systematically influence the TTO valuations themselves and b) bring about convergence between TTO and direct choice.
The objectives of the current study are therefore to 1. Examine whether TTO responses are robust to the procedural variations listed above 2. Examine to what extent direct choices may be predicted from TTO responses
METHODS

Survey Design
To explore all factors of interest, but without over burdening respondents, 8 different versions of the survey were designed and hosted on the Internet. Sections 1 to 3 of the survey were identical for all versions and are described in Appendix 2 (available online). In section 4, respondents were randomized to 1 of 8 versions of the survey according to which variant of TTO-and set of health states-they would see.
Before going on to explain the TTO variants in detail, we first describe the health states used in the survey. The health states were based on the EQ-5D 5L descriptive system. Two sets of health states were constructed-''odd'' and ''even''-which were used in the odd-and even-numbered groups, respectively. The health states are set out in Figure 1 .
The health states were chosen to cover different severities while minimizing the likelihood that any state would be rated as worse than dead by a large number of respondents (we explain this further in explaining the ''direct choice'' questions). It is easy to see, however, that the even set is generally more severe than the odd set. One state-13122-was common to both groups, which offers a test of the impact of ''context'' on valuation. Each set also included one state that strictly dominated at least one other. Thus, 11121 dominates 13122 in the odd set, and 13122 dominates 13224 and 23242 in the even set. The inclusion of strict dominance offers a straightforward test of consistency of responses.
Iterative TTO Procedures
The TTO variants may be separated broadly into ''iterative'' and ''noniterative'' procedures. We begin by describing the ''iterative'' variants in detail.
Iterative, states valued sequentially (i.e., traditional TTO)
This variant replicates a ''traditional'' TTO exercise, although duration is not presented graphically as some researchers have done previously. Respondents are first presented with a choice between 20 years in life A and 10 years in life B.
The scenario as presented to respondents is depicted in Figure 2 using state 21211 as an example. If the respondents preferred 10 years in life B to 20 years in life A, they were then presented with a choice between 8 years in life B and 20 years in life A. If the respondents preferred 20 years in life A to 10 years in life B, they were then presented with a choice between 20 years in life A and 12 years in life B. This iterative process continued until they ''switched'' to preferring life A to life B in successive 2-year intervals or, vice versa, they were then asked about the year in between. For example, if they ''switched'' from preferring life A to life B between 14 years and 16 years in life B, they were then asked about 15 years in life B. The utility value was then taken as the midpoint of the years between which they ''switched.'' So, if they preferred life B at 16 years but life A at 15 years, the utility value was taken to be 15.5/20 = 0.775. Thus, the utilities were measured to the nearest 0.025. If they still preferred life A when the number of years in life B was 19, they were asked about 19 years and 6 months-and then about 19 years and 9 months if they continued to prefer life A. This was done to introduce greater sensitivity toward the top end of the utility space. Those respondents who would not trade even 3 months of life expectancy to avoid the health state in question were considered ''nontraders,'' and a value of ''1'' was attached to that health state.
At the other end of the scale, if they still preferred 1 year in life B to 20 years in life A, they were asked whether they would prefer immediate death to 20 years in life A. No worse than dead valuations were sought-if respondents said ''yes'' to the ''immediate death'' question, their valuation of that health state was taken to be zero.
In this iterative sequential variant, the iterative procedure is followed through to the end for each health state before moving onto the next. Hence, states are valued ''sequentially'' as is traditional in health state valuation exercises such as TTO and SG. The way in which this differs across the remaining iterative versions is explained below. The health states were valued in the following order: 12212, 11121, 13122, 21211 in the odd group and 23242, 13122, 23314, 13224 in the even group.
Iterative, states valued concurrently
This is the variant that is most akin to ''hidden choice-based matching'' discussed above. The main feature of this variant is that, rather than working through the iterative procedure for one health state 
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ORIGINAL ARTICLE before moving onto the next, the iterative procedures were effectively ''spliced'' together and the valuations undertaken concurrently. Hence, even within an iterative procedure, it is arguably less ''transparent'' to respondents what their task is for each state. For example, in the odd version, respondents were first asked to consider 10 years in 12212 (denoted as life A) and 20 years in normal health (denoted as life B). Irrespective of their response, they would next be asked to choose between a different life A-this time 10 years in 21211-and 20 years in life B and so on until all 4 health states had appeared in life A. After this first ''round'' of 4 choices had been completed, the next 4 questions were each the next step in an iterative procedure under way for each health state. Each iterative procedure was identical to that described above for the traditional TTO and continued until all 4 states had been valued. The order in which the states appeared in each round was the same as they were valued in the traditional TTO.
Noniterative Versions
The other broad category of TTO variants deployed in the survey is ''noniterative'' approaches. As the name suggests, the main feature of noniterative TTOs is that they do not set out to ''home in'' on a point of indifference. Rather, respondents are presented with choices that are not based on their previous responses. The use of a noniterative TTO procedure is arguably again making it less transparent to respondents that their task is to equate options. As with the iterative approaches, the noniterative versions may be further classified according to whether health states are valued ''sequentially'' or ''concurrently.''
Noniterative, states valued sequentially
Respondents randomized to the ''noniterativesequential'' variants were first asked to choose between life A (20 years in the first health state under evaluation) and life B (either 4, 8, 12, or 16 years in normal health with that number being allocated randomly). Irrespective of their response to the first question, the number of years in life B was changed to 1 of the 3 remaining durations-again drawn randomly, and so on until all 4 durations had appeared in life B. The responses to the initial 4 questions allowed the ''range'' within which that respondent's utility value lies to be estimated. The number of years in normal health in life B was then set at the midpoint of that range. For example, consider the following sequence of responses to the first 4 questions (where the number of years in life B relate to years in normal health). Depending on their response to that question, they would then be asked about 11 or 13 years (in normal health) in life B. Thus, it is obvious that it is only the first part of the procedure that is truly noniterative (a wholly noniterative system that assessed utility values to the same degree of accuracy as in the traditional TTO would entail presenting respondents with 20 choices for each health state). Utility values were derived in the same way and recorded to the same degree of accuracy as in the traditional TTO. As in the traditional TTO, the valuation procedure is followed all the way through for each health state before moving onto the next. The order in which the states were valued in this version was the same as in the traditional TTO. Unlike with iterative procedures, respondents in the noniterative versions can give inconsistent responses in a TTO for any particular health state, and then no utility value may be estimated, raising the possibility of missing data.
Noniterative, states valued concurrently
In this variant, both the number of years in life B and the health state that appeared in life A were allocated randomly. Thus, the first 16 questions were a random draw from the 16 possible combinations of durations and health states. It could be argued that it is this variant that makes the task of the TTO the least transparent and best replicates the pattern of choices that respondents would face in a DCE. Responses to these 16 questions allowed the ''range'' within which that respondent's utility value for each of the 4 health states lies. The procedure thereafter was exactly as in the ''sequential'' version described above and ended after all 4 health states had been valued. Table 1 shows the 8 TTO variants and identifies which variants may be considered the least transparent and the most transparent.
Direct Choice Questions
All respondents then answered 6 ''direct choice'' questions in which pairs of EQ-5D health states were compared directly to one another, and the choice was between X years in one health state and Y years in the other. This is in contrast to the TTO whereby-irrespective of variant-the actual choice made is always between X years in normal health and 20 years in the ''target'' health state. The relative valuation of 2 different ''target'' health states is then inferred indirectly from the TTO responses. In estimating QALY gains for use in economic evaluation, however, we are generally concerned with ''moves'' between one EQ 5D health state and another, so it could be argued that it is the ''direct'' valuation that is the more legitimate.
The basic idea behind the direct choice questions was to take individuals' TTO responses to 2 different EQ 5D health states and to present them with a choice between X years in one health state and Y years in the other. The values of X and Y were set such that the respondents ought to be indifferent between the two alternatives. More details of the approach are given in Appendix 2.
Suppose that U1 and U2 are the TTO utility values for health states 1 and 2, respectively. The program would first select the state with the lower utility value. Suppose that U1 \ U2. The direct choice would present respondents with X years in The assumption is always that the choice has been set up such that the respondent ought to be indifferent between lives A and B. No direct choice question was generated whenever respondents rated one of the health states as worse than dead or were inconsistent in the valuation of either health state such that a utility value could not be estimated (this could only happen in the noniterative versions). We return to this issue in the Results section.
Analysis
We first tested whether TTO responses are robust to the procedural variations explored here.
We tested procedural variations using a linear regression that allowed for the clustering of observations by respondent. The dependent variable was the TTO value. Dummies were included for the health states (6 dummies, with the base level being the common health state 13122) and TTO method (i.e., iterative concurrent, noniterative sequential, noniterative concurrent). The dummy variables were set up so that the constant term represented the TTO value for health state 13122 under the traditional TTO method (i.e., iterative sequential), and interaction terms were included to explore the impact of the variants on the remaining health states. We used a chi-squared test to determine whether the variant dummies and their interactions were simultaneously zero. This is similar to testing for significant differences between a model with these variant variables added and a model without them (i.e., the difference between full model and reduced models). In another version of this model, we also included a dummy for the even-as opposed to odd-group to provide a means of testing whether the TTO value of the common state (13122) was subject to ''context'' effects.
We next tested whether direct choices may be predicted from TTO responses. If responses to TTO and choice coincide, we expect the ''splits'' in the choices to be 50:50 on average and, hence, the probability of choosing life A or life B to be 0.5. In each case, we tested this by a 1-sample binomial test of whether the probability of choosing life A was significantly different from 0.5. We then pooled the data across direct choice questions and tested whether the pattern of choices of respondents in the other TTO variants were significantly different from those in the traditional TTO by using a generalized estimating equation (GEE) model that allows for clustering of observations on individuals.
RESULTS
Data were collected in June 2014, and 2022 completed interviews were achieved. The sample comprised 947 (46.8%) males and 1075 (53.2%) females. Mean (median) age was 44.6 (45) years with a range of 18 to 70 years. The age/sex breakdown is shown in Appendix 3 (available online) and compared with a representative UK population.
The mean (median) utility values derived for the health states in TTO variants 1 to 8 are presented in Table 2 . In all variants, the general pattern of responses across health states is roughly as expected in that milder states are generally valued more highly than the more severe. There is no immediately obvious pattern, however, across variants of the TTO, but we look at the responses in more detail below.
The full linear regression results are presented in Appendix 4 (available online) and summarized here. Recall that the chi-squared tests here are testing for significant differences between models with and without these variables added (i.e., between a full and reduced model). We find that the chi-squared tests of differences for a model including the variants and their interactions were statistically significant (e.g., noniterative sequential x 2 (21) = 39.07 Prob . x 2 = 0.0096).
The results also showed that the value of 13122 (the common health state that everyone valued and is the intercept term in the regression) was not significantly different between the odd and even groups, indicating that TTO valuations are robust to ''context'' effects (i.e., the coefficient on the even dummy was not statistically different in the model presented in Appendix 4). As a sensitivity analysis, we reran the regression excluding responses that violate dominance and found similar results.
We also tested whether direct choices may be predicted from TTO responses assuming MUI and CPTO by exploring how well the aggregate choices coincide with TTO responses. Recall that if TTO and choice coincide, we expect the ''splits'' in the choices to be 50:50 on average and, hence, the probability of choosing life A or life B to be 0.5. As above, no direct choice would be generated when the respondent valued a state as bad as dead or gave inconsistent responses within a noniterative procedure such that no utility value may be estimated. This resulted in a fairly large number of respondents omitted from the choices, particularly for those involving the more severe states and using a noniterative procedure, but we still had groups of at least 100 subjects. Tables 3 and 4 show the pairs of health states involved in the direct choices and number of respondents who answered each question for the odd and even versions, respectively. Recall that one health state in the pair always appeared in life A or life B each time-in Tables 3  and 4 , the health state that appeared in life A is always the first in the pair. In each case, the direct choice was set up such that it was predicted (from their TTO responses) that the respondent would be indifferent between life A and life B and, hence, we would expect a 50:50 on aggregate. We report first the overall splits of a preference for life A (always involving the first health state in the pair) and life B (always involving the second health state in the pair) in Tables 3 and 4 for the odd and even groups, respectively.
The number of respondents answering each direct choice question ranged from 101 to 179, with the number greater in the odd versions using an iterative procedure (groups 1 and 3) . The combination of the inconsistent responses in the noniterative procedures and valuing at least one of the health states as worse than dead resulted in fewer respondents in the even noniterative versions of TTO (groups 6 and 8) being presented with the direct choice question. It is immediately obvious that many of the splits are a long way indeed from 50:50, with the most extreme split for the 12212/ 13122 pairing being 80:20 in group 3. The standard DCE approach would then assume that difference in utility between 2 lives was very large indeed, yet they have been set here to be equivalent since duration was chosen to produce 2 health profiles with the same utility.
Tables 3 and 4 also show the results of the 1sample binomial tests of whether the probability of choosing life A was significantly different from 0.5. It can be seen that, in the case of the traditional TTO, the null hypothesis (that P = 0.5) is rejected in the case of 4 and 3 of the 6 choices in groups 1 and 2, respectively. In the case of the odd groups, none of the other variants resulted in the null hypothesis being accepted more often than in the traditional TTO. In the case of the even groups, the null hypothesis was accepted in 5 of the 6 choices, indicating that there may have been some slight tendency there to bring the TTO and choice closer, although caution has to be applied due to the smaller numbers of respondents in that group. A general trend shown in Table 4 is that the splits in the last 3 columns involving the more severe states are closer to 50:50. We return to this issue in the Discussion section. It is obvious that the general tendency is to favor life A, which involves the first of the 2 health states reported in each pair and which more respondents valued higher than the other in TTO than vice versa. We return to this issue below. To explore further the overall pattern across TTO variants, we combined the data across the 6 choices and used a GEE model to explore the extent to which choices differed significantly by the TTO method used to elicit the responses. In the GEE model, the dependent variable was the probability of choosing life B, and the constant term estimated the impact on choice for the ''traditional TTO'' in the odd group. As the constant terms show a strong pattern to choose life A that resulted in the move away from 50:50 in the splits, a positive coefficient on the other variables here is indicating that choices are closer to a 50:50 split than in the case of a traditional TTO. Dummy variables and interaction effects were included to investigate whether the modeled effects were less pronounced in certain variants. For example, were the choices of respondents who had completed the ''traditional TTO'' in the even group (on the more severe states) significantly different from the choices of those who had completed the ''traditional TTO'' in the odd group (on the less severe states)? This comparison is captured by the dummy term ''even group = 1.'' Were the choices of those completing the ''noniterative sequential'' TTO on the odd states different from the choices of those completing the ''traditional TTO'' on those same states? This comparison is captured by the ''noniterative sequential'' dummy. Interaction terms were also included to investigate whether the impact of the TTO variant differed across the odd and even groups. Table 5 shows that the significant and positive coefficient on the ''even'' group dummy indicates a higher probability of choosing life B in those groups, which results in choices that are closer to 50:50 than in the odd groups (given that the move away from 50:50 is in the direction of a preference for life A).
We return to the issue of the general preference for life A in the choices as it is worth looking at this in more detail. Recall that the health states that appeared under lives A and B were set in advance by the researchers. Thus, depending on the respondent's TTO valuations, either life A or life B could involve fewer years in the ''better'' health state or vice versa. To explore the pattern of choices in terms of whether the respondent was selecting the life involving fewer years in a better state or vice versa, we show in Tables 6 and 7 the relationship between direct choice and the respondent's own TTO values according to whether U1 . U2, U1 = U2, or U1 \ U2 in each pair. When U1 . U2, life A would then involve the shorter time in the better (for that respondent) health state. When U1 = U2, lives A and B would involve the same number of life years, and when U1 \ U2, life A would involve the longer time in the worse (for that respondent) health state. Tables 6 and 7 show in brackets the number of respondents with each TTO pattern and the percentage of those respondents who went onto choose life A in direct choices. So, for example, for the 11121 v. 21211 comparison in group 1, 60 respondents valued 11121 more highly than 21211 in TTO, and 47% of those went on to choose life A involving fewer years in state 11121. Seventy-six respondents valued 11121 equal to 21211, and 76% of those went on to choose life A in direct choice-in this case involving the same number of years life in 11121 and 21211.
We begin by looking at the cases of dominance where clear predictions may be made (11121 dominates 13122 in the odd groups and 13122 dominates 13224 and 23242 in the even groups). Where one state dominates another but receives the same valuation in TTO, we would expect respondents to overwhelmingly choose the dominant state in a straight choice involving the same number of life years, and our data confirm this finding.
What is more interesting, however, is that even when no dominance exists and U1 = U2 in the TTO, there is often a strong preference for life A involving the first health state in the pair. This cannot be 
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ORIGINAL ARTICLE explained by a preference for a shorter time in a better health state-or vice versa-as the life years in the direct choices are then equivalent. What we have uncovered appears to be a strong preference for the life involving the first state in the pair, which the majority of respondents who had made a distinction in TTO had valued more highly than the other. This suggests that at least a number of respondents did agree with the aggregate ranking of the health states, but that was not reflected in their TTO responses. We return to this issue in the Discussion section.
DISCUSSION
We systematically varied aspects of TTO to bring TTO more in line with how choices would be presented in a DCE that set out to derive utility values using time as the numeraire, sometimes referred to as DCE TTO . We found that TTO responses were not robust to the procedural variations tested here, which is similar to previous studies that have found that different procedures yield different results. 13, 14 For example, it has previously been shown that the elicitation procedures used, 15 whether ''props'' are used or not, 16 and the mode of administration of the survey 17 can all affect the values derived. We then tested whether it was possible to use the TTO valuations to predict direct choices between health states. The direct choices were set up such that any individual respondent ought to be indifferent between the lives on offer in the direct choice and, hence, there would be a 50:50 split in aggregate. We found that a number of the splits were a long way indeed from 50:50 but that the divergence between TTO and direct choice did not disappear when alternative TTO variants were deployed. The divergence from 50:50 was not, however, random but systematically favored life A, which always involved the state that the majority of respondents (who had made a distinction) in the TTO had valued more highly. Those respondents who valued 2 states equally in the TTO (and, hence, were presented with direct choices involving the same number of life years) overwhelmingly went for the life involving the state that the majority had rated as better. This effect was more marked in the odd groups involving the less severe states. Some of the results do appear relatively easy to explain. Respondents who valued 2 states equally in the TTO and, hence, were faced with the same number of life years in the direct choice often had a strong aggregate preference for one state over the other. Based on how DCE responses are analyzed, the utility values of those states would be assumed to be very far apart, and yet they were valued equally in the TTO. At least some of this anomaly may be explained by the fact that respondents who did not trade life years in the TTO were presented with the same durations in the direct choice. Even a slight preference for one health state over the other would then lead them to choose the life involving that state without having to sacrifice any life expectancy. While there is no a priori reason to suppose, for example, that 11121 is better than 21211 for any particular respondent, it appears that many who did value the states equally in TTO did consider 11121 to be better than 21211 and that preference came out in the direct choice. But only around half of respondents who valued 11121 equal to 21211 in the TTO were nontraders on both states, so nontrading alone cannot explain the pattern fully.
In setting up the choices, we did not assume the linear QALY model to hold as we believed that to be too restrictive. While our approach did allow for more flexibility than under the linear QALY model, which is often deployed elsewhere, it could be argued that even the assumptions of MUI and CPTO are strong ones. While space did not permit a detailed discussion of the method here, we did run a parallel study in which the direct choices were set up in such a way that relied only on transitivity. The data showed that failures of the assumptions of MUI and CPTO were not the main drivers of the results reported here. Details of the parallel study are available from the authors on request.
We do, however, believe there may be an explanation of our findings in terms of the differential error structure of TTO and choice. Suppose that in TTO, subjects maximize utility functions U(11121) = V(11121) + error and U(21211) = V(21211) + error and V(11121) . V(21211), where U(.) is the utility used by the respondent in the TTO questions and V(.) is the ''true'' utility value for this subject. Overall, the majority of cases will state U(11121) . U(21211) when V(11121) . V(21211). But there will be some respondents for whom V(11121) . V(21211) and yet who stated U(11121) \ U(21211) due to the overlapping nature of utility distributions. However, in a direct choice, it can be easier for these people to observe that (11121) is milder than (21211) as only ordinal preferences are required.
Of course, the choice results may be driven not only by differences in intrinsic utility but also by how easy it is for respondents to see that one state is better than another, termed ''comparability.'' 18 Likewise, Tversky noted that ''choice probabilities, therefore, reflect not only the utilities of the alternatives in question, but also the difficulty of comparing them,'' 19(p284) and for this reason ''the probability of selecting an alternative depends not only on its overall value, but also on its relations to the other available alternatives.'' 19(p295) This led him to question the assumption that choices can be represented by independent random variables, that is, by an independent random utility model. Our results raise the possibility that something like this may be happening in choices between health profiles. One possible explanation of the finding that the splits were closer to 50:50 for the more severe states is that they are more difficult to compare in that more levels and dimensions are changing at one time. Further discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of the current article, but it raises important questions about the fundamental assumptions underpinning most
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A limitation of the study is that health states were not randomized to life A and life B in the direct choice, and the strong preference for life A could, of course, indicate a tendency to favor the left-hand option. This explanation cannot, however, account for all the findings as it cannot explain the different patterns observed between odd and even groups.
It then seems likely that the disparity between TTO and direct choice that we find in our study is being driven by a combination of factors, certain to do with ''problems'' with TTO that are already well known about (such as insensitivity and nontrading for mild health states), while others are to do with the appropriate interpretation of choice data, which has been rather less explored to date. It would appear, though, that the combination of these factors are more important drivers of the disparity between TTO and choice than the procedural issues we set out to look at here. We recommend that future research address the issue of choices being driven by factors other than differences in utilities and for this to be explored in a systematic way.
